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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
TRUTH IN LENDING AND THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
In the state of nature there were no causes of action ....
I. INTRODUCTION
While it is difficult to trace a legal idea to its origin, the proposition
that a consumer-debtor can circumvent the 1-year statute of limitations'
applicable to Truth in Lending (TIL) 2 actions by raising the TIL claims
in recoupment to the creditor's action on the debt, apparently was first
asserted in 1973 in Kilgore v. Kennesaw Finance Co. 3 In Kilgore, a
creditor brought suit against a consumer-debtor following default on a
small loan. The debtor, in turn, raised the creditor's earlier violations of
the Truth in Lending Act (Act) in recoupment to the claim, hoping to
gain the benefit of the common law rule that claims asserted by way of
recoupment survive the statute of limitations that would apply were the
claims sued upon affirmatively. 4 Although the debtor's claim was dismissed
summarily by the Georgia Court of Appeals,5 the defendant's argument
has since been raised, with varying success, in a number of cases through-
out the country. 6
1. Section 130(e) of the Truth in Lending Act provides in pertinent part:
"Any action under this section may be brought . . . within one year from the date of
the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
2. The Truth in Lending Act is the first title of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970).
3. 128 Ga. App. 120, 195 S.E.2d 799 (1973).
4. See Brief for Appellant at 54-81, Kilgore v. Kennesaw Fin. Co., 128 Ga.
App. 120, 195 S.E.2d 799 (1973) (available from National Clearinghouse for Legal
Services; copy on file in office of Villanova Community Legal Services, Villanova
University School of Law).
5. The appeal was dismissed for want of a final appealable order. 128 Ga. App.
at 120, 195 S.E.2d at 800.
6. Assertion of a TIL claim via recoupment has been allowed, despite the fact
that the statute of limitations barred an affirmative action, in the following cases:
Household Fin. Corp. v. Gabbert, Civil No. 69-55 (Del. C.P., New Castle County,
Sept. 30, 1975) (copy on file in office of Villanova Community Legal Services, Villa-
nova University School of Law) ; Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149,
309 N.E.2d 403 (1974) ; Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Vogel, Civil No. 3353 (N.H. Dist.
Ct., Dec. 1, 1975) (copy on file in office of Villanova Community Legal Services,
Villanova University School of Law) ; Collectors, Inc. v. Atrisco Ass'n, [1974-76
Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. 1 19,211, at 18,041 (N. Mex. Dist. Ct. 1974) ; First
Nat'l City Bank v. Drake, [1969-73 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUM F.R CREDIT GUIDE
98,939, at 88,652 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
The following cases have held that the TIL claim cannot be raised by way of
recoupment after the statute of limitations has run: Signal Fin. Corp. v. Wileman,
Civil No. 237 (Del. Super., Dec. 1, 1975) (letter opinion, copy on file in office of
Villanova Community ]Legal Services, Villanova University School of Law); Hodges
v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974), aff'd,
134 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975) ; Kilgore v. Kennesaw Fin. Co., 128 Ga. App. 120,
195 S.E.2d 799 (1973) (appeal dismissed for want of final appealable order without
reaching the recoupment question) ; Associates Financial Serv. v. Smith, Civil No.
189154 (Ky. C.P., Jefferson County, Aug. 15, 1975) (copy on file in office of Villanova
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By exploring the background of both common law recoupment and the
Truth in Lending Act, the first part of this comment seeks to analyze the
proposition that TIL claims raised by a consumer in recoupment to a
creditor's action on the debt are not subject to the 1-year statute of limita-
tions provided by the Act. The second part considers the various objec-
ions that have been raised to the proposition, and concludes that TIL
recoupment claims are not subject to the 1-year limitation of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Recoupment
Together with setoff and counterclaim, recoupment is a device which
enables a defendant to raise claims against a plaintiff and have them
adjudicated at the same time and by the same court that considers the
claims of the plaintiff.7 With the exception of recoupment, a defendant at
common law had no right to raise his or her own claims in the plaintiff's
proceeding; if the requirements of recoupment were not satisfied,8 the
defendant was forced to institute a separate action.9 Later, procedures for
setoff and counterclaim were developed which permitted a defendant to
assert claims arising outside the strict transaction upon which the plaintiff's
claim was based. But while setoff and counterclaim were solely creatures
of statute,10 recoupment developed entirely under principles of common
Community Legal Services, Villanova University School of Law); Lynch v. Signal
Fin. Corp ...... Mass ........ 327 N.E.2d 732 (1975). See also Gillis v. Fischer, 289
So. 2d 451 (Fla. App. 1974) (counterclaim barred after 21 months).
As of September 1976, then, the boxscore showed a 5 to 5 tie between cases
permitting, and cases prohibiting, the TIL claim to be brought beyond the 1-year
period. However, cases have generally treated the issue superficially, and to date no
single opinion has fully explored its various aspects. For this reason, no attempt is
made in this comment to treat the cases in depth, although reference to individual
cases is made where pertinent to a particular issue.
7. In an early case, Stow v. Yarwood, 14 Ill. 424 (1853), the Illinois Supreme
Court defined recoupment's function: "This doctrine of recoupment tends to promote
justice, and to prevent needless litigation. It avoids circuity of action, and multiplicity
of suits. It adjusts by one action adverse claims growing out of the same subject
matter." Id. at 427; see T. WATERMAN, LAW OF SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT, AND COUNTER
CLAIM 477-81 (2d ed. 1872) [hereinafter cited as WATERMAN].
8. For the requirements of common law recoupment, see notes 10-16 and
accompanying text infra.
9. WATERMAN, supra note 7, at 477-80; see State v. Arkansas Brick & Mfg.
Co., 98 Ark. 125, 135 S.W. 843 (1911).
10. The first setoff statute, allowing the defendant to assert certain extrinsic
claims against the plaintiff, appeared in England in 1729. Stat. 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, § 13
(1728-29), made perpetual by Stat. 8 Geo. 2, c. 24 (1734-35). See WATERMAN,
supra note 7, at 11.
One commentator perceptively noted:
In considering the question raised at the outset whether a counterclaim is
barred by expiration of the limitation period, it is essential to understand the
technical meaning of the counterclaim in light of its historical development. The
2
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law." When the defendant's claim arose from the same transaction that
was the subject of the plaintiff's cause,12 and was capable of being adjusted
in the same proceeding,"3 recoupment was allowed. While not strictly a
defense, since it did not deny the plaintiff's claim,'14 recoupment was in
the nature of a defense - it reduced or struck the plaintiff's claim,15 but
could not yield affirmative recovery. 6
Today, under modern procedure, a defendant may generally raise any
claim arising from the same "transaction or occurrence" that constitutes
the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. 17 For procedural purposes, the
confusion and obscurity in this phase of procedural law arises from the failure of
most courts to distinguish counterclaim, recoupment, and set-off.
Note, Counterclaim: Effect of Statute of Limitations, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 210, 211
(1943) [hereinafter cited as Counterclaim]. The differences between recoupment and
setoff can be summarized as follows. First, recoupment is allowed only where the
defendant's claim arises from the same transaction that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim, while certain unrelated claims may be set off. Second, recoupment
is of common law origin, while setoff is strictly a matter of statute. Third, recoup-
ment is permitted whether the defendant's claim is liquidated or unliquidated, while
many statutes permit the setoff of liquidated claims only. WATERMAN, supra note 7,
at 8-15. Also, a claim asserted by way of recoupment survives as long as the plaintiff's
cause of action exists, while under a number of statutes, a setoff must be asserted
before the running of the statute of limitations which would apply to the defendant's
claim if it were sued upon affirmatively. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. 326 (1922).
11. Annot., 16 A.L.R. 326, 327 (1922).
12. Compare Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935) (taxpayer allowed to
recoup barred claim arising from same transaction on which the government sued),
with Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946) (taxpayer not
allowed to assert barred claim where it did not arise from the same transaction or
single taxable event upon which the government sued). See also Harris Stanley Coal
& Land Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 154 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 761 (1947); Francisco v. Francisco, 120 Mont. 468, 191 P.2d 317 (1948). See
generally Clark & Surbeck, The Pleading of Counterclaims, 37 YALE L.J. 300, 301
(1927). For a discussion of the transaction requirement in the Truth in Lending
context, see notes 60-73 and accompanying text infra.
13. WATERMAN, supra note 7, at 477-81.
14. See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv.
1177, 1245-46 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
15. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935).
16. In State v. Arkansas Brick & Mfg. Co., 98 Ark. 125, 135 S.W. 843 (1911),
the Arkansas Supreme Court pointed out:
Recoupment [at common law] was considered a defense, and prior to the adoption
of the Code, if the defendant's cross-demand against the plaintiff exceeded the
plaintiff's demand, the defendant could use his demand in recoupment only by
sustaining a loss of the excess. Hence, prior to the Code, the defendant could
recover on his cross-demand to the full extent only in an independent action.
Id. at 128, 135 S.W. at 844. See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Counterclaim,
Recoupment and Set-Off, ch. 3, title C, at 217 (1942).
17. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13; PA. R. Civ. P. 1031(a). Rule 13 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure divides counterclaims into two groups: "compulsory"
counterclaims and "permissive" counterclaims. A counterclaim is compulsory, and
must be asserted, when it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). All other
counterclaims under the federal rules are permissive and may be raised despite the
3
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modern statutory counterclaim clearly encompasses most facets of the
common law device of recoupment.'8 However, the separate significance
of common law recoupment has not been totally lost. Modern code plead-
ing was designed only to liberalize the rules of civil procedure, not to
abrogate common law rights.' 9 Hence, in both state20 and federal
courts, 21 a defendant's right to assert a claim by way of recoupment to
reduce or strike the plaintiff's recovery is still recognized to exist.
One of the unique characteristics of common law recoupment is that
it permits the defendant to raise a claim without regard to the statute of
limitations which would apply if the defendant brought an affimative
action on the same claim.22 As one court observed:
Recoupment goes to the foundation of the plaintiff's claim; it is
available as a defense, although as an affirmative cause of action it
may be barred by limitation. The defense of recoupment, which arises
out of the same transaction as plaintiff's claim, survives as long as the
cause of action upon the claim exists. It is a doctrine of an intrinsic-
ally defensive nature founded upon an equitable reason, inhering in
fact that they do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's
cause of action. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
Rule 1031 (a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The defendant may set forth in the answer under the heading "Counterclaim"
any cause of action or setoff which he has against the plaintiff at the time of the
answer (1) which arises from the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences from which the plaintiff's cause of action arose, or (2)
which arises from contract or is quasi-contractual.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1031 (a).
18. One commentator divides counterclaim into recoupment counterclaim, set-
off counterclaim, and new counterclaim, according to the nature of the claim asserted
by the defendant. Counterclaim, supra note 10, at 213-14.
It has also been stated that "[a] counterclaim . . . is a broader and more
comprehensive term than either recoupment or setoff and, as a general rule, embraces
both." 4 STAN. PA. PRAc. 393 (1955).
19. See State v. Arkansas Brick & Mfg. Co., 98 Ark. 125, 129, 135 S.W. 843, 845
(1911). As one commentator has emphasized: "It was never contended that pro-
cedural changes engendered by the codes were to operate so as to deny substantive
rights recognized at common law, and certainly those principles of equity which
justified the common law right of recoupment are as applicable now as then." Counter-
claim, supra note 10, at 215 (footnote omitted).
20. Nearly every state recognizes the common law doctrine of recoupment. See,
e.g., Burger v. Wood, 446 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. 1969); Rogue River Mgmt. Co. v. Shaw,
243 Or. 54, 411 P.2d 440 (1966); Commonwealth v. Berks County, 364 Pa. 447,
72 A.2d 129 (1950).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) ; Lucken-
bach S.S. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963); Multivision Northwest,
Inc. v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 356 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Basic Boats,
Inc. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Va. 1970).
22. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Rothensies
v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946); Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532
(1937); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United
States, 312 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963); Grand Rapids v. McCurdy, 136 F.2d 615 (6th
Cir. 1943) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Williams v.
Neely, 134 F. (8th Cir. 1904) ; Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C.
1955). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 630 (1948); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 326 (1922).
4
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the same transaction, why the plaintiff's claim in equity and good
conscience should be reduced.
2 3
The doctrine that a defendant's claim raised via recoupment survives as
long as the plaintiff's cause of action is consonant with the policy expressed
by statutes of limitations generally. The United States Supreme Court
articulated that policy most recently in United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad :24
The purpose of [statutes of limitations] is to keep stale litigation out
of the courts. They are aimed at lawsuits, not at the consideration of
particular issues in lawsuits. . . . To use the statute of limitations to
cut off the consideration of a particular defense in the case is quite
foreign to the policy of preventing the commencement of stale litiga-
tion. . . . If this litigation is not stale, then no issue in it can be
deemed stale.
2 5
While it appears that a few minority jurisdictions have not recog-
nized the doctrine,2 6 a line of tax cases led by Bull v. United States27 has
clearly established that, under federal common law, a defendant may raise
a claim via recoupment as long as the plaintiff's cause of action survives.
2 8
In light of the federal rule, then, the question presented is whether a
creditor's violation of the Truth in Lending Act may be used by way of
recoupment to reduce his or her recovery on the debt, despite the fact
23. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1941) (footnotes
omitted).
24. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
25. Id. at 72.
26. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 630 (1948). One commentator has suggested, how-
ever, that the minority jurisdictions have not rejected the rule so much as they have
failed clearly to distinguish setoff, which generally must be raised before the applicable
statute of limitation runs, from recoupment, which is not barred by a general statute
of limitations. Counterclaim, supra note 10, at 214-15; see note 10 supra. After an
extensive survey of the cases, another commentator concluded:
Almost without exception the cases which deal with recoupments, so recog-
nized and named, run to the effect that if a defendant's claim is in fact a recoup-
ment the general statutes of limitation do not defeat it; on the contrary it may
be availed of defensively so long as the plaintiff's cause of action exists.
Annot., supra at 660-67 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
27. 295 U.S. 247 (1935). To simplify the rather complicated fact situation in
Bull: it appears that the executor of a decedent's estate wrongly characterized certain
payments made to the estate from the decedent's partnership as a return of capital,
rather than as income to the decedent. Id. at 252. Therefore, the executor paid estate
taxes on the funds, instead of income tax. Id. After the period in which the executor
could sue for overpayment of the estate taxes had elapsed, the Internal Revenue
Service sued for the income tax deficiency. Id. The Supreme Court held that the
executor could recoup the estate taxes from the United States, despite the fact that
the statute of limitations would have barred a direct action for the overpayment.
Id. at 263.
28. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946); Stone v.
White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 645 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 936 (1955); American Cement Corp. v. United
States, 234 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 738
(N.D.N.Y. 1940). See also Miller, Recoupment v. Statute of Limitations, 15 TAX
MAG. 456 (1937).
5
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that institution of affirmative suit under the Act is barred by the 1-year
statute of limitations.
2 9
B. Truth in Lending
The Truth in Lending Act was designed to raise the credit conscious-
ness of the consumer by ensuring full disclosure of credit costs.8 0 Lengthy
legislative inquiry8 l had established that the American credit industry
presented a potential borrower with a bewildering variety of credit options,
each described in a different terminology.32 As a result, the consumer was
rarely able to determine the actual cost of credit.3 In response to these
29. For a fine discussion of the issue under the law of the State of Washington,
see Comment, Construction of a Consumer Remedy: Avoiding the Statute of Limita-
tions, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 543 (1975). It should be noted, however, that the author
assumes therein that where a creditor sues on a debt in state court, and the consumer-
defendant raises the plaintiff's violation of the Truth in Lending Act by way of
recoupment, the state law of recoupment applies. It is submitted that in the situation
posited, the federal law of recoupment would properly apply. See note 58 infra.
30. Section 102 states the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act:
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the costs thereof by
consumers. It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit ...
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
31. The first Truth in Lending Bill, S. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), was
introduced in the Senate on January 7, 1960. In the 8 years before its enactment, the
Act accumulated a massive legislative history. For the highlights of that history, see
CCH INSTAL. CR. GUIDE, Truth in Lending - Law and Explanation, No. 177, at 7
(May 24, 1968).
32. Paul H. Douglas, former Senator from Illinois, chairman of the National
Commission on Urban Affairs, and original sponsor of the Truth in Lending Act,
stated: "The American consumer has been bewildered and numbed by the confusion
in credit, and, as a result, has been educated not to be price conscious." Hearings on
S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings].
33. Senator Magnuson of Washington, noting that a recent credit survey had
uncovered interest rates varying from 5.5% to 192.5%, commented: "The very exist-
ence of such a vast range in interest charges makes it clear that the consumer does
not know how to shop for credit. . . ." Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 33.
General Counsel of the Treasury, Fred B. Smith, stated in a report submitted
to the subcommittee:
Although the consumer credit industry provides a variety of credit plans
which are designed to meet the different needs of different consumers, it is difficult
to see how the average consumer can make a cogent comparison of credit costs
and thereby make an intelligent choice as to alternative sources of credit.
Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 31.
Former Senator Douglas raised as an illustration the situation in which a
consumer buys a car and finances the purchase with dealer-arranged credit:
Car dealers frequently make more money on the finance charge than they do
on the car. . . . What many dealers do is to artifically reduce the cash price of
the car to make a sale while making up the loss in the finance charge. Competition
works in the sale of the car because buyers are well informed about price. But
it does not work in the field of credit, because buyers are not informed about
the price of credit or true interest.
Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 50; see JUSTER & SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY
TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 38 (1964).
6
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findings, the Act struck sharply in two directions: 1) it created a lexicon
to define the various types of credit, 34 and 2) it required that creditors
disclose to the consumer the material terms of the credit transactions.3
5
Thus creditors, under threat of civil 36 and criminal penalties,37 were forced
to translate the old credit idiom into the new language of Truth in Lend-
ing.38 It was theorized that if the terminology could be standardized and
disclosure of the material terms compelled, the consumer would readily
be able to compare diverse credit plans and seek the best credit buy.8 9
Faithful to the free enterprise philosophy, Congress assumed that an in-
formed consumerate would not only protect itself, but privately police
the industry as well.40 It was anticipated that comparison shopping for
34. Truth in Lending Act, sections 106-07, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605-06 (Supp. V, 1975).
35. Truth in ILending Act, sections 121-31, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-41 (1970).
36. Section 130 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970), as
amended (Supp. V, 1975), provided aggrieved consumers with a private cause
of action.
37. Section 112 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970), provided
criminal liability for willful and knowing violation of the Act.
38. The key terms in the language of Truth in Lending are "finance charge" and
"annual percentage rate." For the respective definitions of these terms, see Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4-.5 (1976).
39. The House bill, H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which was par-
tially incorporated into the final version of the Truth in Lending Act, was accom-
panied by a report which stated:
[F]ull disclosure would aid the consumer in deciding for himself the reasonable-
ness of the credit charges imposed and further permit the consumer to "com-
parison shop" for credit. It is your committee's view that full disclosure of the
terms and conditions of credit charges will encourage a wiser and more judicious
use of consumer credit.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
Parenthetically, it may be noted that some creditors have recently begun to
advertise their credit price competitively. A recent radio spot for The Fidelity Bank,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for example, contains the following dialogue:
Announcer: How to use a bank to stretch your money.... Here's Jean McGrory
for Fidelity.
Jean: I could kick myself ! I always shop around for the best price on a new
car .... I never thought of shopping around for a new-car loan. Fidelity Bank
can save me $90!
Announcer: Borrow $4,000 for 36 months from a typical dealer, and the annual
percentage rate is 11.08%. At Fidelity, its only 9.76%.
Jean: My payments are lower. I'd pay Fidelity $128.61 a month instead of $131.11.
It begins to add up.
Announcer: It sure does add up. You'd pay the dealer back $4,720. You'd pay
Fidelity only $4,630. That's $630 in finance charges instead of $720.
Jean: Now I can shop around for the best price on a new car. And on top of
that Fidelity can save me an extra $90. That's like getting the radio for nothing.
Announcer: Fidelity Bank. Member F.D.I.C. Yes, we stretch your money.
Radio advertisement, aired in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on April 3, 1976 (text on
file in office of Villanova Community Legal Services, Villanova University School
of Law).
40. The Attorney General of Wisconsin testified before the Senate Subcommittee
as follows:
Our open-market free-enterprise system is predicated on the principle that the
most efficient allocation of our resources will be made when buyers and sellers
make their decisions to purchase on the basis of their own informed self-interest.
If they are misinformed or uninformed then they cannot give their patronage to
910 [VOL. 21
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credit would generate competition between creditors and, ultimately, re-
duce the cost of credit.41 Viewed from this perspective, the educative
function of the Act was crucial; consumers educated by TIL disclosures
would do more than protect themselves - they would force the entire
industry into healthy competition.
42
In order to compel disclosure, Congress created a civil cause of action
in favor of consumers who do not receive the required disclosures.43 To
recover, an aggrieved consumer need not prove actual damages ;44 he or
she can institute suit for twice the amount of the finance charge on the
credit transaction, with a minimum recovery of $100 and a maximum
the most efficient producer. A misallocation of our natural resources results.
Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 272 (Hon. Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney
General of Wisconsin); see Mourning v. Family Serv. Publications, Inc., 411 U.S.
356, 364 (1973). Former Senator Douglas stated that "if markets are to function
properly, there must be a free flow of information. Perfect competition requires per-
fect information." Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 50.
41. Former Senator Douglas stated:
Aside from protecting the average person on individual credit transactions,
the annual rate provision has an economic significance which may be even
greater in terms of public benefit.
First of all, a rate is like a price. Thus, when creditors are required to
display their prices it is bound to have an impact.
Creditors will begin to compete in terms of price. The overall aggregate
effect may be to lower rates throughout the entire credit industry.
Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 49; see Letter from Fred Smith, General Counsel
of the Treasury, to Hon. John Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Banking and
Currency, April 12, 1967, in id. at 31.
42. Former Senator Douglas emphasized:
Even if after education most consumers still ignore rates, all is not lost. It only
takes a small minority of price-conscious shoppers to police a market and force
sellers to compete on price. Thus, annual rate disclosure can lead to price com-
petition even if a majority of buyers ignore the rates.
Id. at 49-50.
House bill 11601 originally included a national interest ceiling which fixed the
maximum allowable annual interest on a credit transaction at 18%. H.R. 11601, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(1) (2) (1967). During the hearings on the House bill, the
provision was attacked on the grounds that it would tend to fix interest charges at
the maximum allowable rate. James L. Robertson, Vice President of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, noted that "there is a tendency for ceilings
to become floors as well." Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
127 (1967) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary
of the Treasury, expressed the view that the competition fostered by consumer credit
shopping would bring down the cost of credit more effectively than a uniform federal
interest ceiling. Id. at 119-20.
43. Section 130 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970), as amended
(Supp. V, 1975).
44. Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lynch v. Signal
Fin. Corp.. .... Mass. 327 N.E.2d 732 (1975).
Section 130(a) of the Act establishes the prima facie liability of the offending
creditor to the aggrieved consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V, 1975). The
burden is on the creditor to raise the affirmative defenses established by sections
130(b) and 130(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(b), (c) (1970).
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recovery of $1,000. 45 A successful consumer is also entitled to actual
damages,46 if any, and to reasonable attorneys' fees.4
7 Instead of creating
a new enforcement agency,48 Congress encouraged individual consumers to
serve as private attorneys general, aiding in the enforcement of the
statute.49 Thus, in the end, it is largely the creditors who are to bear the
expense of their own regulation.
While TIL litigation has not been unanimously welcomed,
5" the
majority of courts have perceived the importance of the civil suit and have
held that the Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its ultimate goal
45. Truth in Lending Act, section 130(a) (2) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (A)
(Supp. V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
46. Truth in Lending Act, section 130(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1) (Supp. V,
1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
47. Truth in Lending Act, section 130(a) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp.
V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
48. The method of enforcing TIL legislation was frequently discussed in the
congressional hearings on proposed legislation. The House bill, H.R. 11601, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), provided for total administrative enforcement. The Senate
bill, S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), provided for civil liability. The Senate's
approach, supplemented with provisions for partial administrative enforcement, was
eventually adopted.
See generally statement and testimony of J.L. Robertson, Vice Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Senate Hearings, supra note 32,
659-85; statement and testimony of J.L. Robertson, Vice Chairman, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, House Hearings, supra note 42, at 124-50;
testimony of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, id. at 276-77.
Responsibility for administrative enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act was vested
in nine federal agencies, section 108(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1970), each agency
having jurisdiction to secure compliance with the Act in its own area. Truth in Lend-
ing Act, section 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a)-(c) (1970). The Federal Trade Com-
mission was given responsibility for compliance in all areas not specifically committed
to one of the other eight agencies. Truth in Lending Act, section 108(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1607(c) (1970). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was
made responsible for the issuance of regulations to carry out the purposes of the title.
Section 105 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
49. In Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia emphasized the
importance of the civil action: "The Truth in Lending Act clearly contemplates sub-
stantial enforcement through individual consumers acting as 'private attorneys-
general.' No federal agency is provided by the Act with enforcement powers other
than the ones they already possess." Id. at 1248 (footnote omitted).
50. See, e.g., B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 77-79
(Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CLARK & FONSECA], wherein it is suggested that
the Act sets a "trap for the unwary" and that many violations "involve innocent
failure to realize that particular credit transactions fall within the scope of the [Act]."
Id. at 77-78. In the same treatise, the authors flatly state:
In spite of the loud trumpets which heralded the 1968 victory for Truth in
Lending after 8 years of struggle and volumes of hearings in Congress, it seems
likely that the impact of the legislation will be marginal.
Id. at 151 (1972).
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of consumer protection.51 The quantity of potential litigation under the
Act, however, has been severely curtailed by the 1-year statute of limi-
tations provided in section 130(e) :
Any action under this section may be brought . . . within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation.
52
Typically, an aggrieved consumer is unaware that, under federal law, he
or she is entitled to disclosures in consumer credit transactions. Further-
more, the unsophisticated consumer is unlikely to be able to determine
whether disclosures actually given are legally sufficient to satisfy the
stringent requirements of Regulation Z,53 promulgated under the Act.
As a consequence, a TIL violation frequently remains undiscovered until
the consumer consults an attorney. Realistically, this means that many
violations will not be discovered until the creditor institutes legal action
to collect the debt, thereby forcing the consumer-debtor to seek counsel.
Unless the default is immediate and the creditor promptly initiates suit,
the TIL violation may not come to an attorney's attention until after the
statute has run.54 This situation has encouraged the exploration of various
methods of avoiding the bar of the statute of limitations.55
51. In Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
explained:
The scheme of the statute . . . is to create a species of "private attorney
general" to participate prominently in enforcement. The language should be con-
strued liberally in light of its broad remedial purpose.
Id. at 280. See also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1972);
Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1974) ; Thomas v. Meyers
Dickson Furn. Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973) ; N.C. Freed v. Board of Governors,
473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) ; Buford v. American Fin.
Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971). For a discussion of the argument that the
Act is penal and, therefore, to be strictly construed, see note 132 infra.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
53. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226 et seq. (1976). Regulation Z is not a single regulation,
but the collection of all the regulations promulgated under the Act.
54. Referral of the consumer-debtor's account to a collection agency often
precedes the institution of suit, further reducing the likelihood that the violation will
come to the attention of the consumer's attorney before the statutory period has run.
55. A line of cases headed by Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973), considered the question of whether failure to make a
disclosure required by the Act constituted a continuing violation sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations. In Wachtel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the violation was not continuous; it occurred, and was complete, at
the time that disclosures were required. 476 F.2d at 1065-66. But see District Judge
Young's dissent, arguing that failure to disclose constituted fraudulent concealment
of the cause of action tolling the statute until time of discovery. Id. at 1066 (Young,
J., dissenting).
In Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a TIL violation occurs
at the time the loan transaction is consummated; accord, Stevens v. Rock Springs
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974).
In Chevalier v. Baird Savings Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that mere
failure to disclose did not constitute fraudulent concealment and could not, alone, toll
the statute of limitations in a TIL action. Id. at 1284. It was reasoned that since
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The proposition that a violation of TIL by a creditor may be asserted
by way of recoupment after the 1-year period provided for affirmative
actions has run received early judicial approval in a 1974 New Mexico
decision, Collectors, Inc. v. Atrisco Association.5 6 In a terse opinion, the
Collectors court reasoned that the statute of limitations set forth in the
Act preempts state law concerning the effect of recoupment on statutes of
limitations.57 Consideration of the defendant's TIL claim, asserted via
recoupment to the creditor's action on the debt, must therefore take place
virtually all TIL causes of action are based upon the creditor's failure to make the
required disclosures, a finding of fraudulent concealment would render section 130(e)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970), meaningless. Id. However, Chief Judge
Lord, writing for the court, indicated that the fraudulent concealment doctrine would
permit the statute of limitations to be tolled in a TIL action if scienter were alleged.
Id. at 1284-85. Accordingly, he dismissed the complaint without prejudice to allow
the inclusion of an allegation of fraudulent intention. Id. at 1285; see note 104 infra.
See also Lynch v. Signal Fin. Co ........ Mass - -, 327 N.E.2d 732 (1975).
In 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that when the TIL violation at issue results from a misstated or mistaken disclosure
(as opposed to an omitted disclosure) in an open-ended credit plan, the statute of
limitations begins to run from the first date upon which a finance charge was actually
imposed, rather than from the time the credit card was obtained or the first purchase
was made. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1976). The credit plan
at issue in Goldman allowed consumers a "free ride" if they paid for their purchases
within 30 days. Thus, no finance charge was imposed upon the plaintiff in Goldman
until he failed to pay completely for a purchase within the following month. The court
indicated that the 1-year statute of limitations began to run against the plaintiff on
the date that the first finance charge was imposed, because that was the first time
that the plaintiff could have discovered that the disclosures he received were incorrect.
Id. at 21. See also Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975),
wherein the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a violation
of the Truth in Lending Act continued from the time that the loan contract was made
until the time that the contract was executed. Id. at 1139. The Postow court reasoned
that the Act was violated at the time the contract was made; however, mindful of the
fact that the consumer "continued to suffer from an inability to readily compare
various credit terms and avoid the uniformed use of credit throughout the ensuing
period of time," the court concluded that the violation continued, and the statute of
limitations was tolled, until the loan was actually made, 43 days later. Id. It might
be extrapolated from the Postow court's reasoning that a creditor's failure to make
credit disclosures presents a continuing violation whenever the consumer-debtor has a
contractual right to prepay the loan and thereby avoid further finance charges. In
such a situation, the debtor is continually harmed since he or she continually lacks
the information necessary to decide whether or not to prepay.
In Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1974), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the 1-year statute of
limitations applicable to civil actions brought to recover statutory damages was not
applicable to rescission actions under section 125 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970),
as amended (Supp. V, 1975) (adding a 3-year statute of limitations).
For treatment of the proposition that a creditor waives the defense of the
statute of limitations by bringing suit on the debt, see cases cited in note 109 infra.
56. [1974-76 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. f 19,211, at 18,041 (N. Mex. Dist.
Ct. 1974) (summary of opinion) (full text available from National Clearinghouse
for Legal Services; copy on file in office of Villanova Community Legal Services,
Villanova University School of Law). For other cases upholding the recoupment
claim, see note 6 supra.
57. Collectors, Inc. v. Atrisco Ass'n, [1974-76 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP.
19,211, at 18,041 (N. Mex. Dist. Ct. 1974) (summary of opinion).
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in light of the federal common law regarding recoupment.5 8  The court
found that the federal common law rule permitted claims in recoupment
to be raised as long as the plaintiff's claim remained timely, and held that
the defendant could assert the TIL claim despite the lapse of the 1-year
statute of limitations.5 9
58. Id. The supremacy clause indicates that federal law is the supreme law of
the land, notwithstanding anything in the laws of the states to the contrary. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. When a state court construes a federally-created right, it must
refer to the federal law applicable to the right. Thus, a state court is bound to give
effect to express federal statutes of limitation when construing federal causes of
action. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926). As one commentator has stated:
[WIhen Congress qualifies a federally-created right by a specific limitations
period intended to be operative in all courts, it is so operative by reason of
paramountcy of federal law, and analysis in terms of whether or not it is pro-
cedural, or whether or not it is outcome-determinative, is simply irrelevant.
A. Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Action - The Converse of the Erie
Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 403-04 (1956).
A state court must resolve questions of construction of a federal statute under
federal law. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77 (1945), the United States Supreme
Court was required to construe the statute of limitations provided by the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), which barred any actions not "commenced"
within 2 years after the date the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff in Herb
instituted his suit within 2 years of the accident in an Illinois state court. Unfortu-
nately, that court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action.
Pursuant to Illinois state law, however, the court transferred the case to an Illinois
court which did have subject matter jurisdiction. Because this transfer took place
more than 2 years after the accident, the defendant set up the statute of limitations
as a defense, and the plaintiff's cause was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed the dismissal, holding that as a matter of state law, an action was "com-
menced" only when filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that as a matter of federal law, an action is
"commenced" when filed in a state court which, under state law, may transfer the
case to a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at 78-79.
A federal statute of limitations does not exist in the void, but rather is
surrounded by a body of federal common law governing its interpretation and con-
struction. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For
example, in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874), the United States
Supreme Court held that a federal statute of limitations was tolled when the defendant
fraudulently concealed the plaintiff's cause of action. Thus, in Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), the Court recognized that the rule of Bailey v. Glover
is "read into every federal statute of limitation." Id. at 397. See also Moviecolor Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961). A state court, bound to follow
the express limitation in a federal act, may not apply the naked limitation unaccom-
panied by the interstitial federal law that surrounds it. The corollary to this principle,
of course, is that a federal court in a diversity case may not ignore the state judicial
law surrounding the state-created rights at issue. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945). See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 800-06, 825-29 (2d ed. 1973); Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964).
A state court considering a TIL claim, then, is bound to give effect to the
statute of limitations provided by the Act. Further, it is bound to construe that
limitation in light of the federal common law concerning statutes of limitation. The
federal rule that a claim asserted by way of recoupment survives as long as the
plaintiff's cause of action (see text accompanying notes 26-28 supra) is part of the
package of federal law surrounding the 1-year limitation provided by the Act, and
hence should be applied by the state court.
59. [1974-76 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. 19,211, at 18,041. The court noted
that the defendant could not sustain a judgment in excess of the plaintiff's claim. Id.
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A. The Transaction Test
In order to evaluate the merits of the theory that a TIL claim can be
raised by way of recoupment after the 1-year statute has run, several points
must be explored. First among them is the threshold question of whether
a TIL claim satisfies the transaction test of common law recoupment.
Recoupment is available only where the defendant's claim arises from the
same transaction as the plaintiff's cause of action.60 In Hodges v. Com-
munity Loan & Investment Corp.,61 the consumer-defendants contended
that their federal TIL claim could be raised via recoupment against the
state contract claim of the plaintiff.62 The Georgia Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, finding that the transaction test was not satisfied:
Although the [Truth in Lending] claim arose contemporaneously with
the execution of the contract, it is not a product of a breach of any
obligation or covenant therein; nor is it related either to the subject
matter of the contract or the plaintiff's suit. On the contrary, the
borrower's claim for recovery of a penalty created by federal law is
an intrinsic by-product of this transaction and is not dependent upon
the lender's contractual obligations. It has no relationship to an in-
fringement of the mutual obligations and stipulations of the trans-
action. In short, it is not a defense which goes to the justice of the
lender's claim but an affirmative action which demands a penalty for
an independent wrong. Accordingly, borrower's counterclaim is in
the nature of setoff, not recoupment. As such it is subject to the
statue of limitation stated in the federal statute creating the penalty.6 3
The reasoning of the Hodges court is difficult to reconcile with the prin-
ciples of common law recoupment, which do not require that the defend-
ant's claim be of the same form, or controlled by the same body of law, as
the plaintiff's. 64 As long as the two claims arise from the same transaction
60. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). See also note 12 supra.
61. 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974), aff'd, 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d
274 (1975).
62. Id. at 343, 210 S.E.2d at 831.
63. Id. at 344, 210 S.E.2d at 832 (citations omitted).
64. As one commentator has observed:
Although recoupment is only available where both demands spring from one
transaction .... opposing claims, in order to be adjusted in this way in one action,
need not be of the same character.
Therefore, a claim originating in contract may be set up against one founded
in tort, if the claims arise out of the same subject matter, and are susceptible of
judgment in the same action.
WATERMAN, supra note 7, at 564. In Pennsylvania, for example, where a tort claim
ordinarily cannot be counterclaimed against an action in assumpsit, recoupment is
commonly used to raise the tort. 4 STAN. PA. PRACTICE 393 (1955). In Bear v.
Morrison, 27 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1935), plaintiff brought suit for $110 owed on a contract
for a year's farm services. Defendant asserted that plaintiff had negligently allowed
his hogs to destroy two apple trees worth $50, and had willfully cut down two others.
Id. at 28. The trial court permitted the defendant's claims to be raised by way of
recoupment despite the fact that they sounded in trespass. Id. at 30. The court
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and can be adjusted in the same proceeding, recoupment is available.6 5
In the typical TIL situation the transaction at issue will be an extension
of credit. The main thrust of the Act is to put the consumer in possession
of knowledge at the time that this transaction occurs.66 Wachtel v. West,67
and a line of later cases, 68 rejected the argument that a failure to make
TIL disclosures constituted a continuing violation of the Act sufficient to
toll the statute of limitations.69 The teaching of Wachtel is that an
aggrieved consumer's cause of action arises, and is complete, at the very
instant that the transaction is consummated.7 0 The claims of the creditor
and the consumer, by definition,71 arise from the same transaction,72 and
emphasized: "'This is not only good law, but it is good sense. Surely, if my servant
sues me for wages, I may show as a defence to his claim that he has been unfaithful,
negligent or dishonest, or that he wasted or embezzled my property.'" Id. at 30,
quoting Glennon v. Lebanon Mfg. Co., 140 Pa. 594, 601, 21 A. 429, 430 (1891). See
also Cooper v. Frost, 43 Pa. D. & C. 636 (1941).
65. WATERMAN, supra note 7, at 480; see Stow v. Yarwood, 411 Ill. 424 (1853).
66. In Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), Judge Frankel stated: "[The Act's] purpose is to put the borrower in posses-
sion of the pertinent information before the plunge, so that he may know and intelli-
gently compare his options." Id. at 276.
67. 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (cause of
action accrues, and statute begins to run, at the time the disclosures were required
but not given).
68. See note 55 supra.
69. Stevens v. Rocksprings Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974) (statute
runs from the time the transaction is consummated); accord, Kristiansen v. John
Mullin's & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); see Postow v. Oriental Bldg.
Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975) (violation occurs at the time the transaction
is consummated and continues until the time the contract is executed).
70. Were this not the case, an aggrieved consumer might be entitled to statutory
damages without ever entering into a contractual relationship with the creditor. See
Gary v. W.T. Grant Co., CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 98,550 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
71. Regulation 226.8 provides in pertinent part: "GENERAL RULE. Any creditor
when extending credit shall . . .make the disclosures required by this section ....
[S]uch disclosures shall be made before the transaction is consummated." Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1976) (emphasis added).
72. Several federal courts have held that when a consumer brings a TIL action,
the creditor must counterclaim for any outstanding indebtedness. Rollins v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 21 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1088 (E.D. La. June 21, 1976) ; Mims v.
Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. May 6, 1976) (en banc)
(overruling previous line of decisions. to the contrary); Kenney v. Landis Fin.
Group, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1974). The cases reasoned that since the
indebtedness had "arise[n] out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter" of the TIL claim, the creditor's counterclaim was compulsory within the
meaning of Rule 13(a),of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See note 17 supra.
While the transaction test of Rule 13(a) is probably less stringent than the trans-
action requirement of common law recoupment, the language of the cases is none-
theless persuasive. In Mims, for example, the court stated: "[M]anifestly, defendant's
counterclaims arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff's Truth in Lending claims.
Both .. .derive their basis from the same credit transaction." 21 FED. RULES SERV.
2d at 1047.
The correlative principle has also been recognized. In Spartan Grain & Mill
Co. v. Ayers, 517 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1975), the court held that when a creditor brings
a federal action on the debt, the consumer-debtor must raise any TIL claims based
upon the same extention of credit. But see Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F. Supp.
1221 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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since these claims are suscep" 'c cof adjustment in the same proceeding,72
it appears that the requisites , f recoupment are satisfied.
P. Substantive v. Procedural Limitations
Application of the common law rule that a statute of limitations does
not defeat a claim later raised by way of recoupment requires examination
of the particular limitation involved. Traditionally, statutes of limitations
have been characterized as either procedural or substantive. 74  General
statutes of limitation, such as those applicable to contract and tort actions,
are characterized as procedural, while special statutes of limitations, such
as the short term statutes which apply to wrongful death actions,7 5 are
termed substantive73 The general rule is that a procedural statute operates
as a bar to a particular remedy, 77 but does not affect the existence of the
underlying right.78 The running of a substantive statute of limitations,
however, is said to extinguish the statutory right itself.79 The distinction
is important, for while a procedural statute of limitations can be tolled in
the proper circumstances, a substantive limitation prohibits any extension
of the period in which the plaintiff can bring suit.8 0
The substantive-procedural analysis was applied to the TIL statute
of limitation in Fenton v. Citizens Savings Association.8s  In Fenton,
plaintiff-consumers instituted a TIL action after the 1-year limitation had
run, contending that the creditor's failure to disclose the required informa-
tion constituted a continuing violation of the Act sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations.8 2 The United States District Court for the Central
District of Missouri dismissed the action,83 stating that the statute of
limitations in the Act created a substantive limitation on the plaintiff's
right to sue.8 4 The court reasoned that once the 1-year period had elapsed,
the court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.85
73. See notes 111 & 112 and accompanying text infra.
74. See generally Developments, supra note 14, at 1186-88.
75. H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 154-55 (1964).
76. Developments, supra note 14, at 1186-88.
77. The general rule has been expressed as follows:
[A] statute of limitations is regarded as barring, or running against, the remedy
to which it applies, and not as discharging the debt or extinguishing, or even
impairing, the right, obligation, or cause of action, either in law or in fact, and
there is left available to the creditor every other lawful means of realizing on
the debt or obligation.
53 C.J.S. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 6(d) (1959) (footnotes omitted). See also
Developments, supra note 14, at 1186-88.
78. Thus, a mortgagee who finds action on the debt barred by limitations may
still exercise the collateral remedy of foreclosure on the security. See, e.g., Riordan
v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1945).
79. Developments, supra note 14, at 1186-88.
80. See text accompanying notes 85 & 86 infra.
81. 400 F. Supp. 874 (C.D. Mo. 1975).
82. Id. at 879.
83. Id. at 881.
84. Id. at 879 nn.5 & 6.
85. Id. at 879.
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The reasoning of the Fenton court would presumably also bar exten-
sion of the period in which plaintiff could raise a TIL violation in the
recoupment context. Once the 1 year has elapsed, it could be argued that
a debtor-defendant's right to sue has been extinguished forever and can-
not be rekindled by the common law rule concerning recoupment.86
Despite the holding of Fenton, it is submitted that the nature of the
TIL statute of limitations is irrelevant to the question of extending the
period wherein a TIL violation can be raised. This can best be illustrated
in context of the historical development of the substantive-procedural
dichotomy in the area of the statute of limitations. The concept that
special statutes of limitations create substantive limits on actions was first
articulated in an early decision, The Harrisburg,8 7 in which the United
States Supreme Court dismissed a wrongful death action which had been
brought after the applicable 1-year statute of limitations8 8 had run.8 9 In
discussing the wrongful death statute, the Court noted:
The statute creates a new legal liability, with the right to a suit for
its enforcement, provided the suit is brought within twelve months,
and not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought
operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of
the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at
all .... Time has been made of the essence of the right, and the right
is lost if the time is disregarded. 90
Subsequent decisions interpreted The Harrisburg as holding that whenever
a statute created a cause of action that did not exist at common law, and
in the same statutory breath limited the duration of that action, the limi-
tation necessarily affected the right itself.91
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has abandoned the hard
rule of The Harrisburg.92 In Burnett v. New York Central Railroad,93
the Court was presented with the question of whether the 3-year statute
86. Likewise, the rationale of Fenton would prevent tolling the TIL statute of
limitations for any reason. For cases permitting the tolling of section 130(e) of the
Act, see notes 103 & 104 infra.
87. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
88. 12 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1603 (1953) (originally enacted as Act of April 26,
1855, P.L. 309 § 2).
89. 119 U.S. at 214.
90. Id.
91. William Danzer Co. v. Gulf R.R., 268 U.S. 633, 637 (1925); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915) ; Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507,
511 (1915) ; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
92. In Midstate Hort. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356 (1943), the Court
began its retreat. While the Court found the statute of limitations at issue to extinguish
the right, it noted:
Origin of the right [in a statute] is not per se conclusive whether the limitation
of time "extinguishes" it or "merely bars the remedy" . . . . Source is merely
evidentiary, with other factors, of legislative intent whether the right shall be
enforceable in any event after the prescribed time, which is the ultimate question.
Id. at 360 (footnotes omitted).
93. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
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of limitations in the Federal Employers' Liability Act 94 was tolled when
the plaintiff filed a timely suit in state court which was dismissed for im-
proper venue.95 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
had reasoned below that since the limitation was found in the same act
creating the right sued upon, the limitation was substantive.96 Thus, it
held that that "failure to bring the action within the time prescribed ex-
tinguished the cause of action."9 7 The Supreme Court reversed, stating
that the distinction between substantive and procedural statutes of limita-
tions originated in conflict of laws cases and was of "little help in deciding
questions of extending the limitation period."
98
By 1973, the distinction between substantive and procedural limita-
tions had disappeared for purposes of deciding when to extend the period
in which a cause of action could be brought. In American Pipe & Con-
struction Co. v. Utah,99 the United States Supreme Court stated flatly
that the test for tolling a statute of limitations "is not whether a time
limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural' but whether tolling the limitation
in a given context is-consonant with the legislative scheme."' 0 0
With regard to the statute of limitations provided in the Truth in
Lending Act, the ultimate question, then, is not whether the statute pro-
vides a procedural or substantive limitation, but whether there are sound
policy reasons, consistent with congressional intent, to extend the 1-year
period when claims are raised by way of recoupment. The relevant con-
siderations were articulated by the Supreme Court in the Burnett decision:
Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness
to defendants. Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have dis-
appeared." The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust
not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of
limitation ...
This policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently
outweighed, however, where the interests ,df justice require vindication
of the plaintiff's rights.10 1
94. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
95. 380 U.S. at 426.
96. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 332 F.2d 529, 530 (6th Cir. 1964).
97. Id.
98. 380 U.S. at 427 n.2. The Court held that the federal statute was tolled during
the pendency of the state proceedings. Id. at 435-36. See also Glus v. Brooklyn E.
Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959) (doctrine of equitable estoppel allows extention
of statute) ; Midstate Hort. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356 (1943) (intent
of the legislature the ultimate question).
99. 414 U.S. 538 (1973).
100. Id. at 557-58. The Court continued, stating:
[T]he mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also
sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of
the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain
circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
Id. at 559.
101. 380 U.S. at 426-27 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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The exact purpose of the 1-year limitation does not appear from the
legislative history.10 2 Yet, while the short limitation period was probably
intended to counterbalance the highly technical nature of the disclosure
required by the Act, courts have held that the 1-year statute may be tolled
by the filing of a class action, 03 or by fraudulent concealment of the TIL
violation. 104
When there is a question of extending a limitation period, the Burnett
Court indicated that the "policy of repose, designed to protect defendants"
must be weighed against the "interests of justice."' 0 5 The general policy
of repose which runs throughout our jurisprudence is based upon several
considerations. First, as the Court noted, it is unfair for a party to delay
suit for so long a period that evidence disappears and witnesses forget
the matter in dispute. 10 6 Second, if there is to be any certainty in the
dealings of one person with another, there must be a time after which
old wrongs will be forgotten. This consideration is of special importance
in commercial areas because of the high cost of determining, evaluating,
and insuring against dormant liabilities. 10 7 Third, the goal of judicial
economy and smooth functioning of the legal system is best served when
parties are encouraged to bring their disputes to the courts promptly, so
that they can be swiftly resolved therein.' 08
Although the general policy of repose is an important consideration
in determining whether to extend the TIL statute of limitations, the
policy is not as weighty in the recoupment context as when affirmative
suit is threatened. 0 9 First, the problems of lost evidence and absent
102. See Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 149, 151, 309 N.E.2d 403,
405 (1974).
103. In Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the filing of
a class action based upon TIL violations tolled the 1-year statute for all class members
who did not bring suit during the pendency of the class action determination. Id. at
448 n.13. See also Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ; Shields v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971).
104. Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see
note 55 supra. See also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1976)
Lynch v. Signal Fin. Co., ___ Mass. 327 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1975).
105. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
106. 380 U.S. at 426-27; see Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314 (1945).
107. Developments, supra note 14, at 1185-86.
108. Id.
109. When the creditor affirmatively sues on the indebtedness, it may be questioned
whether the policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is particularly applicable.
See United States v. Capital Trans. Co., 108 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1952). In Capital
there was a collision between defendant's vehicle and a vehicle owned by the govern-
ment. The government brought suit for damages more than 2 years following the
accident. The defendant counterclaimed for damages sustained in the collision. The
government argued that the counterclaim should be dismissed because the 2-year
statute of limitations of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970),
had run. Noting the inequity in permitting the government to preclude defendant's
counterclaim merely by waiting 2 years to bring its own action for damages, id.
COMMENTS
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witnesses, stressed in the Burnett decision,110 are unlikely to arise in
TIL recoupment cases. Indeed, proof of a TIL violation requires very
little evidence and few witnesses."' Compliance can generally be deter-
mined from a single sheet of paper, and since a large part of the credit
industry includes the required disclosures on the loan instrument itself,
evidence of compliance with the Act should always be available to a
creditor bringing an action on the debt. 112 Second, if TIL recoupments
were to be barred after the 1-year limitation period, a creditor that had
failed to comply with the Act would be encouraged to delay suit on the
indebtedness until after the statute had run against the consumer. 1 13 Such
a result would be anomolous in light of the policy that legal rights are to
be promptly vindicated. Third, when a TIL violation is raised by way of
recoupment, rather than by independent suit, duplicative litigation is
avoided and judicial economy served.
On the other side of the balance, the "interests of justice" which are
to be weighed against the policy of repose" 14 are especially strong in the
recoupment context. As noted previously, the historical impetus under-
lying the doctrine of recoupment was the fundamental inequity present
when the judicial system recognized one debt, but ignored another, where
at 350, the court held that by waiting to bring suit the Government waived the
right to assert the statute of limitations. Id.; accord, United States v. Shainfine,
151 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Contra, United States v. Thrower, 267 F. Supp.
608 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
In the TIL context, the same reasoning would seem to apply in those situa-
tions where the consumer defaulted on the contract within the 1-year period and the
plaintiff made no effort to secure a judgment at that time.
110. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
111. Often there is no issue of material fact and the question of compliance is
resolved on motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Philbeck v. Timmer's Chevrolet,
499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Eby v. Reb Realty Co., 495 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974) ;
Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1975) ; Buford v. American
Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
112. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1976).
113. A parallel situation was considered by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). In that case, a railroad
which had shipped certain ammunition for the government brought suit against the
United States for the difference between the tariff paid and that allegedly due. In
defense, the United States raised the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's shipping
charges. The applicable statute of limitations for the plaintiff's action was 6 years,
but the United States' claim was governed by a 2-year statute of limitations. The suit
had been filed after the 2 years had run. Deciding that the United States could raise
the matter of unreasonableness in defense to the plaintiff's claim, the Court stated:
Only the clearest congressional language could force us to a result which would
allow a carrier to recover unreasonable charges with impunity merely by waiting
two years before filing suit.
Id. at 71.
Since one basic policy of statutes of limitations generally is to discourage
litigants from sleeping upon their rights, Developments, supra note 14, 1186-88, it
would be ironic if the short TIL statute of limitations discouraged creditors from
prompt vindication of their contractual rights.
114. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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both debts sprang from the same transaction."15 In the Truth in Lending
situation this inequity is amplified by the pressures which frequently pre-
vent individual consumers from bringing affirmative suit. A consumer
who is making payments over a long period of time will understandably
be loathe to institute a TIL action for fear that the hostility generated by
the suit will result in the creditor's refusal to service the product, or its
insistence upon strict compliance with the form contract. 1 6 Thus, it is
submitted that, regardless of whether the 1-year limitation is termed sub-
stantive or procedural, strong policy factors compel application of the
common rule concerning recoupment.
C. The 1974 Amendments
In 1974, section 130 of the Act was amended by the addition of sub-
section (h), which provides as follows:
A person may not take any action to offset any amount for which
a creditor is potentially liable to such person under subsection (a) (2)
against any amount owing to such creditor by such person, unless the
amount of the creditor's liability to such person has been determined
by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action to
which such person was a party."17
In the single decision to consider the meaning of this amendment to date,
Associates Financial Service v. Smith," s a Kentucky trial court inter-
preted section 130(h) as barring all setoffs or counterclaims not asserted
within the 1-year period. The court stated:
In a word, the meaning of this Amendment appears, to this Court at
least, that the debtor must bring his own action on the truth and lend-
ing cause of action against the creditor as a offset within a year,
which of course would not affect the creditor's claim until this was
done. Correspondingly, it would seem that an offset or counter-claim
115. See notes 7-16 and accompanying text supra. See generally WATERMAN,
supra note 7.
116. As Circuit Judge Pell noted in 1974:
[N]o particular perceptiveness of modern society is needed for an awareness of
a fact of life lying in the virtually perpetual monthly payment program of many
families. As balances owing decline new purchases occur. The individual if
aware at all of his claim under the Act is bound to have some reluctance to sue
in his own name the supplier with whom he continues to do business and one
who could be in a position to visit harsh remedies on the buyer in the event of
a subsequent default.
Haynes v. Logan Furn. Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974). Of course,
once the creditor institutes suit against the consumer, the reluctance noted by the
court is likely to disappear.
The Haynes court also noted that the poor and uninformed would often fail
to bring affirmative individual actions. Id.; see text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(h) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
118. Civil No. 189154 (C.P., Jefferson County, Ky., Aug. 15, 1975) (copy on file
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brought within a year of the date of the loan could serve the same
purpose.
119
While the reasoning of the Associates court is not altogether dear, it
apparently proceeded from the notion that a counterclaim, or for that
matter, recoupment, is an "action to offset" an amount for which the
creditor is potentially liable, before liability has been "determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction."'120 It is submitted that this reading of
section 130(h) is unsupportable.' 2' Rather, the term "action," as used in
the statute, should be read as action in the ordinary nonlegal sense. 122 So
construed, the section forbids self-help withholding of statutory damages
in reliance upon another's judgment. 128  Under this reading, the effect
119. Id. at 3 (slip opinion).
120. See also Clontz, Current Developments in Truth-in-Lending, in 1975 CON-
SUMER CREDIT 156 (Practicing Law Institute ed. 1975).
The adoption of section 130(h) suggests a possible collateral argument in
support of the creditor's position. By forbidding self-help withholding, Congress has
indicated that the creditor is legally entitled to the contractual amount unreduced by
statutory damages until the violation is adjudicated. This is to say, essentially, that
a TIL violation is never a defense to liability on the debt. If recoupment is a defense,
it is thus implicitly forbidden by section 130(h) of the Act. Cf. CLARK & FONSECA,
supra note 50, at 92.
There are, however, two problems with this argument. First, while recoup-
ment is in the nature of a defense, it is not exactly a defense, for it does not deny the
validity of the plaintiff's claim. Instead, a claim by recoupment seeks to reduce the
plaintiff's recovery for the equitable reason that plaintiff is obligated to the defendant.
See notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra. Thus, in the technical sense postu-
lated, recoupment is not a "defense" to the creditor's claim; it is a reduction in the
amount of liability.
Second, if Congress had intended to abrogate the common law right of
recoupment, it could have done so in a far clearer and more explicit fashion. Given
the fundamental maxim that statutes in abrogation of the common law are to be harshly
construed, an intent to bar recoupment would presumably have been implemented in
a manner calculated to survive judicial construction.
121. In response to the author's inquiry, Ralph J. Rohner, Staff Counsel for the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, responded:
[Section 130(h)] was a concession to the card issuers' concern that consumers
would allege Truth in Lending violations and simply unilaterally deduct the
minimum penalty ($100) from their bills, forcing creditors either to absorb the
loss or sue for the balance owing. This was apparently thought reasonable
because successful consumer plaintiffs under Truth in Lending were assured not
only the minimum recovery but also costs and attorney's fees in actions brought
by the consumers themselves.
Parenthetically, I understand some bank lawyers are now promoting an in-
terpretation of this subsection to the effect that when a card issuer sues for an
unpaid balance the consumer defendant cannot even interpose a Truth in Lending
violation as a defense or counterclaim unless that violation had been previously
adjudicated as such in a separate action brought by the consumer. This it seems
to me, is a perversion of the section's intent.
Letter from Ralph J. Rohner to Author, January 29, 1976 (on file in office of Villanova
Community Legal Services, Villanova University School of Law).
122. Counterclaim,, supra note 10, at 546.
123. See CLARK & FONSECA, supra note 50, at 92. The authors remark that self-
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of section 130(h) is twofold: 1) the consumer who withholds the statutory
damages prior to a judgment on the claim is responsible for interest on
the amount withheld until the date that liability is adjudged; 2) self-help
withholding amounts to a breach of contract entitling the creditor to liqui-
dated damages and attorneys' fees if so provided in the agreement. The
single piece of legislative history associated with the section's adoption
supports this interpretation:
This provision is intended to prevent consumers from simply deduct-
ing from their obligation to a creditor the minimum $10 award,
which is provided for in individual actions, without being a party to
an action in which such liability is determined by a court.
124
Thus, unless an individual consumer is a party in a class or individual
action where the TIL issue is actually litigated, the consumer cannot uni-
laterally offset the statutory damages.125 Nothing in this section, however,
prevents a consumer from litigating the TIL issue by way of recoupment.
124. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TRUTH IN
LENDING AcT AMENDMENTS, S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973). The
quotation continues: "However, nothing in this section prevents a series of individual
civil actions to recover $100 in the case of any violation." See note 125 infra.
125. Many of the 1974 amendments to the Truth in Lending Act concerned the
consumer class action. A line of cases led by Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), had refused to allow TIL class actions. It
was perceived that a recovery of the $100 minimum by each class member could
impose a staggering burden upon the creditor, far beyond the contemplation of the
drafters of the Act. In Ratner, for example, the creditor faced a liability of
$13,000,000 for a "technical and debatable violation." Id. at 416. Loathe to impose
a "horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment," id., the court found that the class
action prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) were not present,
since a class action was not superior to individual recovery. Id.; see Alpert v. United
States Indus., 59 F.R.D. 491, 500 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1973), and cases cited therein.
The 1973 report to congress by the Board of Governors of the Federal
System stated:
To reiterate the problem, the Act's required minimum recovery of $100 per con-
sumer plaintiff, when coupled with a class action, could theoretically lead to
immense class recoveries against major creditors defendants. The potential size of
such recoveries apparently has led many judges to deny maintenance of Truth in
Lending suits as class actions. The Board believes that if this judicial trend were
to continue, the deterrent of potential class action liability which helps to ensure
creditor compliance with the Act would be effectively lost.
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, TRUTH IN LENDING ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE
YEAR 1973 9 (1974).
The 1974 amendments expressly authorized consumer class actions, but set
no minimum recovery per class member. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V,
1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970). Instead, the amendments left the
award to the court, listing several factors to be considered. Id. § 1640(a) (3). The
maximum recovery was limited to the lesser of $100,000 or 1% of the net worth of
the creditor. Id. § 1640(a) (2) (B).
The difference in recovery between individual and class actions probably
necessitated the addition of section 130(h). 15 U.S.C. § 1640(h) (Supp. V, 1975),
amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970). If self-help withholding were permitted, a class
member would be wise to opt out of a class action, with its potentially smaller re-
covery, and simply withhold the $100 minimum statutory damages. If a number of
individuals did this, the same staggering penalties seen before the amendments could
result. Section 130(h) of the Act prevents reliance upon the favorable judgment of
another, thus requiring a class member who opts out to relitigate the issue.
22




Recognition that a defendant may raise a violation of the Truth in
Lending Act by way of recoupment to reduce a creditor's recovery in an
action on the debt is not inconsistent with either precedent or Congres-
sional intent.126  Yet, presently, a small- or medium-sized creditor is
virtually assured of avoiding liability under the Act by postponing suit
against defaulting consumers until a year has passed from the date of the
loan.127 The practical success of the Truth in Lending Act depends upon
grassroots litigation by the individual consumer.' 28 While class actions
will force the large creditors to obey the law, achievement of the Act's
goals will be delayed until the neighborhood creditor discovers that a
finance charge is not collectible from an aggrieved consumer. 129
As the Supreme Court has noted, "the burdens imposed [by the Act]
on creditors are not severe when measured against the evils which are
avoided.- 130 Since the Act is remedial 31 and to be construed in favor
126. See notes 30-59 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
128. The Truth in Lending Act is a composite of a House bill, H.R. 11601, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), and a Senate proposal, S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
See note 48 supra. The House bill provided purely administrative enforcement. The
Senate bill, on the other hand, proposed the civil liability section that was ultimately
adopted. During the Hearings on S. 5, Senator Proxmire commented on the civil
enforcement provisions: "Is it not true that ... the law would be largely - I would
anticipate - self-enforcing; that a consumer who felt that the law had been violated
can sue in court, and in general it would be my understanding that the law would
be enforced in this way." Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 682.
See also Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
129. Two commentators have observed that "most little merchants will probably
not come into compliance until they have been caught a couple of times." CLARK &
FONSECA, supra note 50, at 91. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
has noted annually that the compliance record of the smaller creditors is not as good
as that of the larger creditors. For the most recent statement, see FED. RES. BD., 1975
TRUTH IN LENDING ANNUAL REP. 11, in CCH INSTAL. CR. GUIDE, No. 379, part II
(Jan. 14, 1976).
130. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371 (1973).
131. Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1974) ; Thomas
v. Myers-Dickson Furn. Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973); N.C. Freed v. Board of
Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) ; Allen v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Buford v. American Fin.
Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
However, a line of cases has held that the civil liability provisions of section
130 of the Act are penal. See Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975)
Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Lynch v. Signal Fin. Co.,...
Mass -..., 327 N.E.2d 732 (1975).
It should be noted, however, that Congress created the civil cause of action
solely in favor of the aggrieved consumer, not any consumer interested in being
a private attorney general. See note 70 supra. The Act reflects a recognition that
damages to the aggrieved consumer are difficult to measure, although the injury caused
is no less actual. In Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970), the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio stated:
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of the consumer, 13 2 construction of section 130(e) should be narrowly
confined to its express message:
Any action under this section may be brought . . . within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation.133
In other words, while suits instituted more than 1 year following the viola-
tion are barred, claims raised by way of recoupment to an action already
before the court are not subject to the Act's statute of limitations.
Joseph A. Dworetzky
It was noted in the legislative history of the Act that some consumers would lack
the means to institute their own civil actions. Moreover, it would seem that in
many transactions the actual damage sustained by the consumer would be so
small that he would not think it worth his time and effort to institute a civil
action. Statutes which provide for minimum damages as an incentive to the
injured person to invoke the remedy are not, of course, strangers to the law.
Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
While the majority of courts have followed the conclusion of the Ratner
court that "the 'remedial' character of the provision for civil recovery quite over-
whelms its allegedly 'penal' aspect," 329 F. Supp. at 282, it is unnecessary to decide
whether the section is penal or remedial. The distinction is nothing but a guide to
legislative intent. See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
65 (3d ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND]; text accompanying note 132
infra. Here, the intent of Congress is manifest even in the title of the Act: The
Consumer Credit Protection Act. The burden that the statutory damages impose upon
noncomplying creditors cannot change the conclusion that the civil liability section of
the Act should be broadly construed to effectuate the congressional intent. As Suther-
land notes in his treatise on statutory construction:
[WIhere the hardships imposed upon the individuals by penal statutes are rela-
tively small or insignificant, the same impelling reasons are present for putting
greater emphasis on the policy of the legislation. Consequently, statutes imposing
relatively mild punishments will be treated with less strictness. One point of
demarcation here will be found in statutes which impose criminal penalties on the
one side, and statutes which impose penalties recoverable in civil actions by
private individuals on the other.
SUTHERLAND, supra at 67.
132. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 131, at 29-32 (4th ed. 1974).
133. Section 130(e) of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 640(e) (1970)
(emphasis added).
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